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Dein Christ war jüdisch,
Dein Auto ist japanisch,
Deine Pizza italienisch,
Deine Demokratie griechisch,
Dein Kaffee brasilianisch,
Dein Urlaub türkisch,
Deine Zahlen arabisch,
Deine Schrift lateinisch,
— und Dein Nachbar ist “nur” ein Ausländer? 1

I.

INTRODUCTION: WITHOUT EQUALITY, NO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

It began with an aspiring teacher who wanted nothing more than to wear a
piece of cloth. It turned into a contentious legal battle and political debate that
has consumed Germany over the past several years, with no end to the controversy in sight. Why? The teacher-in-training was a religious Muslim and the
piece of cloth a hijab, an Islamic headscarf.2
The aspiring teacher’s name is Fereshta Ludin.3 Born in Afghanistan in
1972, she has lived in Germany since 1987 and became a German citizen in
1995.4 Attending university to become a schoolteacher, she successfully completed
the last of two state examinations in 1998.5 The Oberschulamt Stuttgart [Supervisory School Authority of Stuttgart] (“SSA”),6 however, refused to employ
Ludin in the state’s school system, concluding that Ludin “lacked personal qualifi1.

This popular German saying is often recited (in this or one of many similar variations) in the context of
discussions about Ausl änderfeindlichkeit (xenophobia), and the author has heard it many times in his
German high and elementary schools. Its translation reads as follows:
“Your Christ was Jewish, / your car is Japanese, / your pizza Italian, / your democracy Greek, /
your coffee Brazilian, / your vacation Turkish, / your numbers Arabic, / your script Latin, / —
and your neighbor ‘just’ a foreigner?”
(Source unknown). The saying is meant to call attention to the hypocrisy of discrimination rooted in
racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia by pointing out the contributions that foreign individuals and cultures have had — and continue to have — on German culture and everyday life.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author’s, as are all translation mistakes.

2.

While there are different forms of the hijab and of the Islamic headscarf in general, a result of the headscarf’s having undergone various developments throughout the history of Islam, the kind of headscarf that
sparked the German headscarf debate was of the variety that covers a woman’s hair but not her face or the
rest of her body as other forms of the headscarf do (such as the burqa or the chador). See generally
Sabiene Enderwitz, Geschichte des Kopftuchs im Orient: Kopftuch ist nicht gleich Kopftuch [History of the Headscarf in the Orient: The Headscarf is not the Headscarf], QANTARA.DE: DIALOG
MIT DER ISLAMISCHEN WELT [QANTARA.DE: DIALOGUE WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD], May 4, 2004,
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-548/_nr-17/_p-1/i.html (German), http://
www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-549/_nr-6/_p-1/i.html (English) (discussing the history of
the headscarf through the ages and how it has adapted and has been adapted to the times).

3.

See , e.g., Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004 BYU L. REV. 665,
672 (2004).

4.

Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003,
2 BvR 1436/02, A.I.1 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr
143602.html [hereinafter Headscarf II].

5.

Id.

6.

This translation for “Oberschulamt Stuttgart” is borrowed from Campenhausen, supra note 3, at 672.
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cations”7 because she insisted on wearing the Islamic headscarf while teaching.8
After unsuccessfully lodging a complaint with the SSA, Ludin commenced a lawsuit in the Verwaltungsgericht [administrative trial court] of Stuttgart, alleging
that the SSA’s reason for denying her employment violated her right to freedom
of religion and equal treatment.9 Ludin did not prevail in the administrative
trial court and appealed to the Verwaltungsgerichtshof [administrative court of
appeals] of Baden-Württemberg (the Land 10 in which Stuttgart is located).11
When her appeal to the administrative court of appeals failed, Ludin sought review by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Administrative Court]
(“FAC”).12 The FAC granted review but rejected Ludin’s constitutional challenge (in the “Headscarf I” decision).13
Running out of options, Ludin appealed the FAC’s decision to Germany’s
highest court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court]
(“FCC”).14 On September 24, 2003, after five years of prolonged legal battle,
Ludin finally prevailed. The FCC held that the SSA’s refusal to employ Ludin
because she wore an Islamic headscarf violated her rights under the Basic Law
and reversed the decisions of the courts below (in the “Headscarf II” decision).15
Ludin’s victory, however, was but a pyrrhic one: The FCC based its holding on
a lack of a sufficient statutory foundation for the SSA’s denial of Ludin’s employment application,16 thereby allowing the legislature of Baden-Württemberg —
and of each of the other Länder 17 — to deny a job to a teacher who insists on
donning an Islamic headscarf by simply enacting a statute that provides the foundation for such a denial.18
7.

Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at A.I.2.

8.

Id.

9.

Id. at A.I.3–.6.

10. Land is the German word for “state.” Sixteen states make up the Federal Republic of Germany. See infra

note 17.

R

11. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at A.I.5–.7.
12. Id.
13. Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] [Federal Administrative Court] July 4,

2002, 2 C 21.01 (F.R.G.), available at
Headscarf I].

http://www.bverwg.de/media/archive/727.pdf

[hereinafter

14. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at A.II.
15. Id. at B.III.
16. Id.
17. Germany is a federal republic consisting of sixteen states, or Länder (the plural for Land), which are in

many respects conceptually similar to the several states that comprise the United States of America. For
an overview of the Federal Republic of Germany (“F.R.G.”), its federal system, its 16 states, and more, see
generally GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE, FACTS ABOUT GERMANY (2003), available at http://
www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de.
18. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.III.
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Predictably, Baden-Württemberg’s legislature swiftly enacted a law banning teachers from wearing headscarves in public schools.19 Meanwhile, the
FAC, where Ludin’s case was still pending on remand from the Headscarf II
court, upheld Baden-Württemberg’s new headscarf law (in the “Headscarf III”
decision).20 In the end, Ludin decided to forego further appellate review of the
Headscarf III decision.21
In the aftermath of the Headscarf II decision, the legislatures of half of
Germany’s sixteen Länder moved quickly to enact laws banning public school
teachers from wearing headscarves in school,22 and similar laws were being debated or reviewed in several more Länder.23 In all, fewer than one third of the
Länder have decided not to enact legislation to ban or otherwise regulate headscarves24 — at least for the time being.25
This Note contends that most, if not all, of the different laws banning Islamic headscarves from public schools are unconstitutional because they are
fraught with exceptions for Christian and occidental beliefs and values and,
therefore, discriminate against Muslims.26 Some German Länder, in a move
19. Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes Baden-Württembergs [Act Amending the School Code of Baden-

Württemberg], April 1, 2004, Baden Württemberg GBl. S. 178, Nr. 6 (F.R.G.), available at http://
www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/GesetzBadenWuerttemberg01042004.htm (German), http://www.unitrier.de/~ievr/eng/kopftuch.htm (abridged English).
20. BVerwGE [Federal Administrative Court], June 24, 2004, 2 C 45.03 (F.R.G.), available at http://

www.bverwg.de/media/archive/2282.pdf

[hereinafter Headscarf III].

21. Muslimische Lehrerin beendet Kopftuchstreit [Female Muslim Teacher Ends Headscarf Battle],

SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,322310,00.html.
22. In total, eight Länder have enacted such laws. See Institut für europäisches Verfassugsrecht (IEVR)

[Institute for European Constitutional Law (IECL)], Arbeitsmaterialien zum Staatskirchenrecht: Kopftuchverbot für Lehrkräfte in Deutschland [Working Materials on State-Church Law: Headscarf Prohibition for Teachers in Germany], http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/kopftuch.htm (German), http://
www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/eng/kopftuch.htm (abridged English) (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (website by the
University of Trier’s IECL, tracking headscarf legislation in the various Länder and offering for
download the texts and draft versions of enacted and proposed laws and other legislative materials) [hereinafter Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials].
23. Headscarf legislation proposals have been formally submitted in three Länder. See Headscarf Prohibition

Working Materials, supra note 22.
24. Currently, five Länder are not planning to regulate the wearing of headscarves by teachers in public

schools. See id.
25. See Bundesländer uneins in Debatte um Kopftuchverbot in Schulen: Unterschiedliche Positionen

über Parteigrenzen hinweg [Federal Länder Divided in Debate Over Headscarf Ban in Schools:
Different Positions Across Party Lines], 123RECHT.NET, Oct. 8, 2003 (F.R.G.), http://www.123recht.
net/article.asp?a=6807 (noting that some of the Länder that do not currently plan enacting headscarf
legislation (1) may nevertheless favor such legislation by the Federal government, (2) may wait to see how
other Länder will react, or (3) believe that their particular law already provides sufficient statutory
foundation to exclude teachers who insist on wearing headscarves in public schools).
26. Some of the laws are phrased in such ways as to allow for the argument that certain kinds of Christian

religious pieces of clothing and other symbols do not fall under the categories of religious clothing and
symbols banned.
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reminiscent of Orwellian doublethink, argued for the enactment of laws that prevent headscarf-wearing Muslims from teaching in public schools (and thereby
exclude Muslim minorities on the basis of their faith) by claiming that doing so
would further integration and the fight against discrimination.27 This unequal
treatment of different religious groups by Germany’s lawmakers is all the more
unfortunate because in Germany’s “open-minded, modern, . . . tolerant,”28 multicultural, and multi-ethnic29 society, in which the right to “practice one’s faith
unhindered”30 is guaranteed by the German Basic Law,31 meaningful freedom of
religion for members of religious minorities is a function of equal treatment
under the law.32 The German Basic Law recognizes the importance of equality,33 repeatedly emphasizing the right to the equal protection and enjoyment of
the Basic Law’s rights and privileges,34 including the right to freedom of relig27. See , e.g., Franz Josef Jung, CDU-Fraktionsvorsitzender im Landtag Hessen [Political Faction Chair-

man of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the State Parliament of Hessen], Rede im Landtag
Hessen zum Gesetz der Sicherung der staatlichen Neutraliät [Address Before the Hessen Parliament Regarding the Law for the Protection of the Neutrality of the State] 1, 4–6 (Feb. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.franz-josef-jung.de/PDF/04_Kopftuchrede.pdf (stating that the Islamic headscarf stands for
the oppression of women and is a symbol of intolerance). This “intolerance of the headscarf,” he argues,
“must be effectively opposed. It leads to parallel societies and hurts integration. Integration instead of
division must be [the] motto.” [“Der Intolleranz des Kopftuchs muss wirkungsvoll entgegengetreten werden. Sie führt zu Parallelgesellschaften und schadet der Integration. Integrieren statt Spalten muss unsere
Devise sein.”] According to him, wearing of the headscarf is irreconcilable with the principles of equality
and non-discrimination. His arguments proved persuasive: Hessen enacted a headscarf ban eight months
later. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.
28. GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE, supra note 17, at ch. “Society.”
29. See , e.g., id. at ch. “Society,” section “Immigration and Integration” (stating that about nine percent of

Germany’s population is foreign).
30. See id. at ch. “Churches and religious communities” (follow “Society” hyperlink; then “Religion” hyperlink

located in “Background” category located at the bottom of the page).
31. See id.
32. See , e.g., Hans Maier, Editorial, Zwischen Kopftuch, Kippa und Kreuz [Between Headscarf, Yar-

mulke, and Crucifix], RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.islam-bremen.de/
rheinMerkur080104.pdf (Hans Maier, an expert on religion and former Minister of Education in Bavaria, states that “[n]othing is as sacred to a secular state as equality.” [“Nichts ist einem säkularen Staat so
heilig wie die Gleichheit.”]); see also Jurgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 2, 6, 11 (2003) (“[R]eligious toleration is basic to a democratic constitutional state.” And,
further, “reciprocal toleration of different religious doctrines . . . is mandatory in a liberal state.”). For an
article discussing religious freedom and equality in Germany, and noting the need for increased integration of the Muslim minority, see Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV.
643, 656–58 (2001). For an article discussing, inter alia, the jurisprudence of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court on the principle of equality and differential treatment with respect to religious freedom, see
Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of
Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 489–94 (2001).
33. The German Grundgesetz [Basic Law or Constitution] declares a number of basic rights, amongst them

the right to equality before the law. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 3(1) (F.R.G.).
34. The German Constitution reiterates the importance of equality when it expressly provides for freedom

from discrimination on the basis of religion, among other bases, id. at art. 3(2), and expressly prohibits
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ion.35 Under the law today, however, equality is a fiction for Germany’s religious Muslims.
Part II of this Note will explore the history, origins, and characteristics of
Germany’s Muslim population. Part II will also briefly examine the Islamic
headscarf, its religious significance, and the surrounding political controversy.
Part III of this Note will discuss the landmark Headscarf I, II, and III decisions
of the FAC and the FCC (collectively, the “Headscarf decisions”). Further, Part
III will survey the specific laws that have been enacted, proposed, or considered
in response to the FCC’s Headscarf II decision. In Part IV, this Note will
demonstrate that most of the Länder’s headscarf laws fail the FCC’s guidelines
for equal treatment of religions because they carve out de jure exceptions for
“Christian and occidental beliefs and values.” Finally, Part IV will critique some
of the possible solutions to the issues raised by the Headscarf decisions, concluding
that all religious clothing and symbols should be expressly and unconditionally
permitted.
II.

GERMANY’S MUSLIM POPULATION AND THE ISLAMIC HEADSCARF

A.

The Origins of Germany’s Muslim Population

The German headscarf debate — both legal and political — did not take
place in a vacuum, but rather in a Germany that is today one of “the world’s two
largest recipients of immigrants,”36 a Germany in which Muslims constitute the
second-largest religious group,37 and a Germany in which Turks make up the
single largest immigrant group,38 ninety-five percent of whom are Muslim.39
The tensions that arise from attempts at integrating Germany’s Turkish and
Muslim populations — both of which are on the rise40 — underlie and gave rise
discrimination in the public service on the basis of religion or worldviews, id. at art. 33(2)–(3).
Throughout the text of the German Constitution, equality is at “center stage.”
35. The Grundgesetz guarantees freedom of religion: Id. at art. 4(1)–(2).
36. Peter Schuck & Rainer Münz, Introduction to P ATHS

TO INCLUSION: THE INTEGRATION OF MIUNITED STATES AND IN GERMANY, at vii (Peter Schuck & Rainer Münz eds., 1998).
The other country is the United States. Id.

GRANTS IN THE

37. E.g., Informationsplattform Religion [Information Portal for Religion], Islam, http://www.religion-on-

line.info/islam/islam.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
38. See, e.g., Rainer Münz & Ralf Ulrich, Changing Patterns of Immigration to Germany, 1945–1995:

Ethnic Origins, Demographic Structure, Future Prospects, in MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUGERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 93 (Klaus J. Bade & Myron Weiner eds., 1997) (stating that
“Turkish nationals . . . are by far the largest [immigrant] group” in Germany).

TURE:

39. See, e.g., GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE, supra note 17, at ch. “Muslim communities” (stating that

“[i]n Germany, there are about 3.3 million Muslims from 41 countries. [Of these,] Turkish Muslims form
the largest group . . .”); John D. Snethen, Trend Paper, The Crescent and the Union: Islam Returns to
Western Europe, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 251, 260 n.58 (2000) (stating that ninety-five percent
of Turks are Muslim).
40. See infra Part II.A.2.
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to the debate over the Islamic headscarf. Of course, tensions arising because of the
Islamic headscarf are not confined to Germany. Other European countries, including the United Kingdom and France, have tackled the question of how to best
deal with the Islamic headscarf with respect to public institutions and civil servants (and, in the case of France, private citizens) in public institutions.41 Other
countries aside, Germany’s tensions are related to its Turkish — and therefore
Muslim42 — populations. The history of Germany’s Turkish population and the
dynamics that brought it to Germany43 demonstrate, however, that Turks and
Muslims are in Germany to stay — as is the headscarf debate.
1. What Brought Muslims to Germany — A Brief History of
the Turkish Gastarbeiter
Germany’s Turkish population finds its origins in the mid-1950s, when
Germany began an “organized foreign labor recruitment” effort with the German–Italian Treaty of 1955.44 For several years, however, these Gastarbeiter
[guest workers] did not play an important role in Germany’s labor force.45 Then,
in 1961, the building of the Berlin Wall brought the availability of labor from the
former East Germany to a grinding halt.46 Not coincidentally, 1961 also marked
the year that Germany signed a labor recruitment treaty with Turkey.47 The
closing of the East German/West German border that accompanied the building
of the Wall constituted the watershed event that opened the floodgates to a dramatic increase in foreign labor.48 By 1964, the one-millionth guest worker had
arrived in Germany,49 and by 1973, foreign labor employment peaked at 2.6

41. E.g., Gesetze in Europa: das islamische Kopftuch [Laws in Europe: The Islamic Headscarf],

DER-

STANDARD.AT, Mar. 8, 2005, http://derstandard.at/?url=/?id=1976191 (Austrian online newspaper surveying the laws in various European countries). In England, it has been illegal since the early 1980s to
discriminate on the basis of religion in public service and the private industry; therefore, Islamic headscarves, Sikh turbans, or other religious clothing or symbols are worn by public servants and officials,
including police officers and judges on England’s high court. Id. In France, by contrast, it has been
unlawful since 1905 for public servants to wear any religious clothing or symbols while carrying out their
public service functions. Id. Starting with the academic year 2004–2005, that law has been extended to
apply to all students in public schools, making France one of the most restrictive countries in Europe with
respect to the Islamic headscarf and other religious clothing and symbols in public schools. Id.
42. See supra notes 38–39.

R

43. See infra Part II.A.1.
44. Klaus J. Bade, From Emigration to Immigration: The German Experience in the Nineteenth and

Twentieth Centuries, in MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUTURE, supra note 38, at 23.

R

45. Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 67.

R

46. Bade, supra note 44, at 23.

R

47. Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 78.

R

48. Bade, supra note 44, at 23.

R

49. Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 79.

R
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million guest workers,50 of whom Turkish Gastarbeiter constituted the largest
group.51
These Turkish immigrants became the foundation of today’s Turkish population as guest workers “gradually evolved into immigrants”52 and as family reunifications increased,53 both made possible in significant part by eased
restrictions on the renewal of guest workers’ residence permits.54 The
Anwerbestop [labor recruitment stop] of 1973,55 through which Germany tried
to stem the tide against the rising number of foreigners, ironically strengthened
the “the already growing tendency toward permanent residence.”56 Guest workers, faced with the option of indefinitely living apart from their families or returning to their home countries and thereby foregoing the chance of being
readmitted to Germany, increasingly elected a third option: bringing their families to Germany.57
By 1979, as a result of the increases in family reunifications,58 as well as
rapid population growth within the guest workers’ communities,59 the number of
foreigners in Germany exceeded that at the time of the Anwerbestop in 1973.60
2. Germany’s Modern-Day Muslim Population
With the pathways to immigration for foreigners, and particularly Turks,61
firmly set in place in the 1960s–1970s, fertile soil was planted for the introduction and growth of a Muslim population in Germany62 — with dramatic results:63 Between 1980 and 1999 alone, the Turkish population in Germany
increased from 1.5 million to 2.1 million — a 40.4% increase.64 As of 2004,
50. Id.
51. Id. (stating that by 1973, there were 605,000 Turkish guest workers living and working in Germany).
52. Bade, supra note 44, at 23.

R

53. Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 82.

R

54. Id.
55. Bade, supra note 44, at 23.

R

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 67.

R

60. Bade, supra note 44, at 23.

R

61. See Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38.

R

62. See sources cited supra note 39.

R

63. The words Turks and Muslims are used interchangeably for the remainder of this section, as 95% of Turks

in Germany are Muslim and the majority of Muslims in Germany are of Turkish descent. See sources
cited supra note 39.
64. Ulrich Mammey & Karl Schwarz, The Demographic Characteristics of the Immigrant Population in

Germany, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE DIRECTORATE OF SOC. AFFAIRS & HEALTH, THE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 203 (Werner Haug, Paul Compton & Youssef
Courbage eds., 2002).

626
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Germany’s total foreign population numbered 7.3 million, of which about a
quarter — 1.8 million — is made up of Turkish citizens.65 The slight decline in
Turkish foreigners from 1999 to 2004, moreover, is most likely not a result of
Turkish nationals leaving Germany, but because more former Turkish citizens
are becoming naturalized German citizens.66 In fact, Germany’s population of
Turkish origin and, therefore, of the Islamic faith, is on the rise — even as Germany’s native population is decreasing by some 150,000 people annually67 —
because Turks boast the third-highest birth rates in Germany.68 Germany’s current Muslim population is 3.2 million strong.69
As Germany’s population of Turkish origin increases, so will Germany’s
Muslim population.70 It is not unreasonable to expect that the importance of the
Muslim population to Germany’s political landscape will neither diminish nor
cease to exist, and it stands to reason that neither will the debate over the Islamic
headscarf or attempts to find legal and political solutions to it.

65. F ED. STATISTICAL OFFICE

OF GERMANY, P OPULATION
www.destatis.de/basis/e/bevoe/bevoetab4.

BY

SEX

AND

CITIZENSHIP (2005), http://

66. Mammey & Schwarz, supra note 64, at 213 (showing that from 1991 to 1999, the number of Turks

R

becoming naturalized German citizens has increased from 3529 to more than 100,000). The authors,
presumably writing before post–1999 data was available, projected further increases beginning in 2000
because of eased naturalization procedures that went into effect that year. Id. Moreover, under German
law, the children born in Germany to Turkish nationals are automatically entitled to German citizenship
(conditioned on the child’s either giving up its Turkish citizenship at birth or retaining dual citizenship
until its 18th birthday, at which time the child must chose which citizenship it wishes to retain). Id. This
is not insignificant, as the current number of 1.8 million Turkish “foreigners” includes some 600,000 who
were born in Germany. F ED. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF GERMANY, FOREIGN POPULATION ON
31.12.2004 BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (2005), http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/bevoe/bevoetab10.htm.
67. Mammey & Schwarz, supra note 64, at 239.

R

68. Id. at 226.
69. GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE, supra note 17, at ch. “Society.”
70. This prediction, of course, is limited to the increase of the Muslim population as a function of the increase

of the population of Turkish origin and is based on the fact that the majority of German Muslims are of
Turkish origin and the reasonable conjectures made on that basis.
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B.

An Overview of the Islamic Headscarf

The Islamic headscarf exists in a variety of forms.71 It is widely misunderstood, with a plethora of meanings and symbolisms attached to it72 that obscure
the debate and overwhelm any but the most careful observer.
1. The Religious Significance of the Headscarf
A female Muslim’s claim and belief that her religion commands her to wear
a headscarf, though not entirely uncontroversial even within Islam, is consistent
with several schools of mainstream Islamic religious thought, traditions, and
practice. Generally, Muslims derive an obligation to wear some form of headscarf from the Koran.73 However, there is neither agreement as to the form of
headscarf that is mandated,74 nor uniformity of opinion as to whether it is actually mandated at all.75 Some Islamic scholars also disagree whether the religion
71. Some of the most commonly known forms are the hijab and the chador. E.g., Kopftuch, Schleier und

Verhüllung [Headscarf, Veil and Veiling], http://www.religion-online.info/islam/themen/info-kopftuch.
html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). Another type of veil that, at least since media reports in recent years
about conditions in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, is known to many is the burqa, which literally
means “tent;” it is one piece of clothing that covers the entire body with only a mesh for the eyes. Id. (The
burqa, however, does not feature in the German headscarf decisions or political debates.) The hijab is
literally a scarf or throw that covers a female’s hair and, sometimes, shoulders and chest but leaves her face
otherwise unobstructed. E.g., id. The chador is similar to the hijab, but it usually covers a greater
portion of the female’s body and conceals the wearer’s face entirely except for the eyes. E.g., id. In public
discourse, both the hijab and chador are commonly referred to as a “headscarf,” e.g., id., although it was
the hijab, worn by Ludin, that sparked the Headscarf decisions.
72. E.g., Kopftuch und Bekleidungsvorschiften [Headscarf and Laws Governing Clothing], http://

www.religion-online.info/islam/themen/kopftuch.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (stating that the headscarf is a symbol of female oppression for some, while an expression of individual religiosity for others).
The website, a government-sponsored project of the Media and Information Service for Religious Science
[Religionswissenschaftlichen Medien- und Informationsdienst], also provides links to other sources
discussing the justifications for wearing the Islamic headscarf and points out that even within Islam those
justifications do not always overlap. Compare, e.g., Jung, supra note 27, at 1 (calling the Islamic headscarf a fundamentalist political symbol representing the oppression of women and lack of freedom), with,
e.g., Heide Oestreich, Zwei Gesichter unterm Tuch [Two Faces Behind the Veil], QANTARA.DE:
D IALOGUE WITH THE I SLAMIC W ORLD , Mar. 27, 2004, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/
show_article.php/_c-548/_nr-19/_p-1/i.html (discussing that to some young, modern, religious female
Muslims, the headscarf signifies freedom, dignity, and identity).
73. E.g., Kopftuch und Koran [Headscarf and the Koran], http://www.religion-online.info/islam/themen/

info-kopftuch-koran.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (stating that advocates of a duty to don the headscarf base such obligation on the Koran, and providing German translations of the relevant portions of the
Koran: Suras 24:31, 24:60, and 33:59). For an English translation of the relevant portions of the Koran,
see THE KORAN (J.M. Rodwell trans., Project Gutenberg 2002), http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3434.
74. E.g., Kopftuch und Koran [Headscarf and the Koran], http://www.religion-online.info/islam/themen/

info-kopftuch-koran.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (“Auch in der islamischen Welt gibt es keine
Einigkeit, in welcher Form sich Frauen in der Öffentlichkeit verhüllen müssen.” [“In the Islamic world,
too, there is no agreement regarding the way in which females must conceal themselves.”]). For an English translation of the relevant portions of the Koran, see THE KORAN, supra note 73.
75. E.g., Aluma Dankowitz, Inquiry and Analysis Series — No. 169: The Muslim Debate Over the

French Veil Ban, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (“MEMRI”), Apr. 5, 2004, http://
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of Islam permits a woman to choose to not wear a headscarf, for example when
living in a foreign, predominantly non-Muslim country,76 even though those
same Islamic scholars agree that wearing the headscarf is, in fact, a religious
requirement.77 Thus, despite certain discord between Islamic religious authorities, a particular female Muslim’s individual belief that she must wear a headscarf is not inconsistent with mainstream Islamic religious thought, tradition,
and practice.
2. The Symbolism of the Headscarf
Generally, most observant Muslim women who wear the headscarf reject
the notion that it is a political symbol,78 pointing instead to its religious meaning
and its positive effects. Some female Muslims who, based on their religious beliefs, choose to wear a hijab ascribe a rather different meaning to the headscarf.
They see it as liberating, allowing them to participate as emancipated and dignified members of a secular society.79 The headscarf, they claim, affords them dignity and protects them from unwanted sexual advances.80 To them it is a means
of imposing boundaries on the surrounding, secular world in the way they believe
their faith demands.81

memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16904 (comparing the position of the European Council for Islamic Religious Decrees and Research, headed by Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi, who is “considered the spiritual leader of Islamist organizations” and who is “one of the most prominent Islamic
figures in the Arabic-language media,” that the headscarf is “an indisputable religious duty,” with the
position of various Islamic intellectuals that the headscarf is nothing more than an Islamic tradition
because the Koran does not expressly identify the headscarf as a religious duty) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
76. E.g., id. (comparing the position of Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, head of the Al-Azhar Univer-

sity in Cairo, that “Islamic law permits Muslim women living in France to remove the veil” because of
“compelling circumstances,” with the position of the European Council for Islamic Religious Decrees and
Research that “[t]here is not doubt that every Muslim woman who comes of age is obligated, according to
Islamic law, to wear a veil.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Jörg Lau & Toralf
Staud, “Das Kopftuch ist nicht so wichtig” [“The Headscarf Is Not That Important”], DIE ZEIT,
June 3, 2004 (quoting Rıdvan Çakir, Chairman of Ditib, Germany’s largest Islamic organization, as
saying that even though the headscarf is prescribed by religion, it is the individual’s choice whether to
follow the religious prescription).
77. E.g., Dankowitz, supra note 75 (noting that Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi and Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid

R

Tantawi both agree that the headscarf is “a religious edict, not a religious symbol”).
78. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Sabine Schiffer, Das Kopftuch in den Medien:

R

Instrumentalisierter Symbolcharacter [The Headscarf in the Media: A Symbol Which Has Been
Instrumentalised], QANTARA.DE: DIALOGUE WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD, Apr. 20, 2005, http://
www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-548/_nr-27/_p-1/i.html (German), http://www.qantara.
de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-549/_nr-17/_p-1/i.html (English).
79. E.g., Oestreich, supra note 72; see also Enderwitz, supra note 2.

R

80. E.g., Oestreich, supra note 72; see also Enderwitz, supra note 2.

R

81. E.g., Oestreich, supra note 72; see also Enderwitz, supra note 2.

R
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However, dismissing the religious or liberating meanings that observant
Muslim women attach to it,82 opponents of the Islamic headscarf assign to it a
rather different significance. To them, the headscarf is a political symbol of radical Islamic fundamentalism,83 demonstrating the oppression of females,84 an attitude of intolerance,85 and irreconcilable opposition to Western democratic
values.86 They dismiss the claims of young Muslim women that the headscarf is
a liberator as the delusional effects of extremist religious brainwashing.87 Some
warn that the Islamic headscarf is a tool of Islamic fundamentalists who plan
nothing less than the violent overthrow of Western democracy.88
Sadly, headscarf opponents generally offer little to support for their generalized characterizations of, and accusations regarding, the headscarf (even while
wholeheartedly embracing other religions’ clothing and symbols).89 On the other
82. See , e.g., Jung, supra note 27, at 1 (“Das islamische Kopftuch ist eben nicht nur ein Glaubenssymbol,

R

sondern es ist auch und gerade ein politisches Symbol.” [“The Islamic headscarf is not only a symbol of
faith but also, and especially, a political symbol.”]).
83. E.g., id. (“Es steht für den fundamentalistischen Gottesstaat, der im klaren Widerspruch zu unserer

Verfassung steht.” [“It stands for the fundamentalist religious state that stands in clear contradiction to
our Constitution.”]).
84. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“Viele vom islamischen Recht, der Scharia, geprägte Staaten bekennen sich zur Unter-

ordnung und Unterdrückung der Frau . . . und haben dafür als äußeres Symbol [das islamische Kopftuch]
gewählt.” [“Many states influenced by Islamic law, the Sharia, admit to the subjugation and oppression of
women . . . and have chosen [the Islamic headscarf] as external symbol thereof.”]).
85. E.g., id. at 4 (referring to the “intolerance of the headscarf” [“die Intoleranz des Kopftuchs”]).
86. E.g., id. at 1 (“[D]as Kopftuch und die Weltanschauung, die damit verbunden ist, [stehen] nicht im

Einklang mit den Grundrechten unseres freiheitlichen demokratischen Rechtsstaates.” [“The headscarf
and the world view attached to it do not stand in agreement with the basic rights of our liberal, democratic, constitutional state.”]); id. at 4 (“[W]er glaubt . . . eine solche Art von Unterdrückung von Freiheit
in Zusammenhang mit unserer Rechtsordnung, unserem Rechtsstaat und unserer Verfassung zu bringen,
der irrt ganz gewaltig. [“Whoever believes that . . . such an oppression of freedom is reconcilable with our
rule of law, our constitutional state, and our Constitution is entirely wrong.”]).
87. See , e.g., id. at 2–4 (arguing that women are subjugated in fundamentalist Islam and are under the

authority of their husbands, thus — since Jung equates religious Islam with fundamentalist Islam —
suggesting that they are unable to make their own decisions; also citing anecdotal stories of females who
feel coerced into wearing the Islamic headscarf out of fear of reprisals).
88. E.g., id. at 2 (“[D]as Tragen des Kopftuchs in staatlichen Institutionen [ist] längst zum Kampfprogramm

von islamistischen Kräften geworden . . . .” [“The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public institutions
has long become the combat program of Islamic powers.”]).
89. See , e.g., id. (rejecting the Islamic headscarf but unquestioningly embracing Christian and Jewish relig-

ious clothing, symbols, and values); Kopftuchverbot in Bayern Verabschiedet [Headscarf Ban Passed
in Bavaria], NETZEITUNG DEUTSCHLAND, Nov. 11, 2004, http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/
312834.html (describing the argument by Monika Hohlmeier, Minister of Culture of Bavaria, that nonMuslim symbols like a nun’s habit or the Jewish yarmulke are not prohibited even while the headscarf is
prohibited as a ‘religious symbol’); see also Ruti Teitel, The Veil Wars, P ROJECT SYNDICATE, http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/teitel1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (stating that public opinion
opposing the veil is attributable “less [to] religion than [to] racist xenophobia, anti-immigrant feelings,
and resistance to multiculturalism”). Teitel’s statement, although made in the context of France’s headscarf debate, is remarkably applicable to Germany’s situation. For two interesting observations that may
help to partially explain the voters’ and many Germans’ xenophobic attitudes, see Bade, supra note 44, at
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side of the debate, Pope Benedict XVI, while still Cardinal Ratzinger, so poignantly called attention to the fallacy of equating a firm commitment to faith with
extremism: “Having a clear faith, based on the creed of the church, is often labeled today as fundamentalism.”90 Clearly, however, the Islamic headscarf is
more than a mere piece of clothing. It is a piece of clothing burdened with conflicting religious, social, and political meanings and symbolism that can not be
reduced to superficial, general slogans in hopes of accurately conveying the depth
of its meanings. And while headscarf-wearing Muslim women deny that it is a
political symbol, its critics have succeeded, at the very least, in politicizing the
headscarf.91 As discussed above,92 however, the individual decision to wear the
Islamic headscarf is consistent with mainstream schools of Islamic thought and
therefore constitutes a legitimate expression of a Muslim female’s adherence to the
Islamic faith.93
III.

THE THREE HEADSCARF DECISIONS AND THE LÄNDER’S RESPONSE

The landmark Headscarf decisions and the laws that the Länder promulgated in response raise fundamental questions about equality and the right to
religious freedom under Germany’s constitutional scheme.
A.

Ludin’s Headscarf Troika

As set forth in greater detail above,94 Fereshta Ludin challenged the policy
of the School Supervisory Authority (“SSA”) of Stuttgart in Baden-Württemberg
that denied her employment as a public school teacher because of her Islamic
headscarf. The challenge first led to the Federal Administrative Court’s (the
24 (observing that former East Germany’s treatment of its foreign guest workers — including “stateprescribed separation” and quartering in “separate mass accommodations” — created a “social vacuum” in
which a “latent xenophobia began to grow that erupted at the end of the [former German Democratic
Republic’s] existence”), and Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 73 (noting that, for decades, the German
government’s official stance on immigration and integration of immigrants was that “Germany is not a
country of immigration. [It] should not be a country of immigration today and must not become one in the
future.” The authors explain that “[t]his official stand also reflects the view of many Germans.”). Together, these materials reasonably permit to critically question any assertion that the public’s and the
legislators’ opposition to the headscarf is not, at least in part, rooted in xenophobia.

R

90. Cardinal Josef Ratzinger, quoted in Ian Fisher, Pope Benedict XVI: The Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

20, 2005, at A1. Then-Cardinal Ratziner made this comment in the context of the Catholic faith; however, his observation is equally applicable to the context of the Islamic headscarf.
91. See Female Muslim Teacher Ends Headscarf Battle, supra note 21 (quoting Ludin as saying “I wear

the headscarf exclusively for religious reasons and not at all for political or other reasons. Different media
as well as some political circles have politicized my intent . . . .” [“Das Kopftuch trage ich ausschließlich
aus religiösen und keineswegs aus politischen oder anderen Gründen. Verschiedene Medien sowie manche
politischen Kreise haben meine Absicht . . . politisiert.”]).
92. See supra Part II.B.1.
93. The remainder of this Note is based on that understanding in defending a Muslim woman’s right (to

chose) to wear a headscarf.
94. See supra Part I.
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FAC’s) Headscarf I decision95 and second, to the Federal Constitutional Court’s
(the FCC’s) Headscarf II decision.96 In response to Headscarf II, the Länder
quickly enacted the first headscarf laws, with Baden-Württemberg leading the
charge.97 Soon thereafter, the FAC upheld Baden-Württemberg’s headscarf ban
in its Headscarf III decision.98
1. Headscarf I: The First Decision of the Federal
Administrative Court
After Ludin failed to prevail with her complaint before the administrative
trial and appellate courts in Baden-Württemberg,99 she appealed to the FAC.100
Ludin argued before the FAC that the state of Baden-Württemberg committed a
wrongful administrative action when the SSA of Stuttgart denied her employment on the grounds that she lacked personal qualification because of her insistence on wearing an Islamic headscarf.101 More specifically, Ludin contended
that the courts below erred, as a matter of law,102 when they failed to recognize
that the SSA’s policy violated her right to freedom of religion under Art. 4(1),103
95. See Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01.
96. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02.
97. Act Amending the School Code of Baden-Württemberg, supra note 19, at 3. Baden-Württemberg was the

first Land to enact a headscarf ban. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22, at 4.

R
R

98. See Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 5.
99. For a summary of the lower court cases and citations, see supra Part I. For an excellent, more in-depth

summary of the early procedural history of Ludin’s cases, see also Campenhausen, supra note 3, at pt. II.A.

R

100. The FAC is Germany’s highest court for “all matters involving the correctness of administrative decisions

and administrative action including non-monetary claims against the state for wrongful administrative
action.” PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 6 (2004). For a general overview of the German court system, see id. at 6–7; DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST
GERMANY: A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 48–55 (1976).
101. Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01 at 3.
102. Since this was Ludin’s review appeal [“Revision”] to the high administrative court (as opposed to the

second instance appeal [“Berufung”] from the trial court to the court of appeals), she could “raise only
issues of law or of correct procedure.” MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 100, at 17.
103. The Basic Law guarantees freedom of religion: “Die Freiheit des Glaubens, des Gewissens und die

Freiheit des religiösen und weltanschaulichen Bekenntnisses sind unverletzlich.” [“Freedom of
creed, of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or non-religious faith are inviolable.”] GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4(1) (F.R.G.), translated in AXEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW
(GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (May 23, 1949) at 19
(2002) (throughout this Note, all translations of the Basic Law, unless otherwise noted, are Axel
Tschentscher’s).
Notably, under the plain language of the German Constitution, the Art. 4 right to freedom of religion is
unqualified. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444 (1989) (“[T]his particular liberty [i.e. religious freedom] is undiminished by the
reservation clauses that qualify other constitutional rights.”). Limitations of basic rights spring out of
balancing competing and otherwise unqualified basic rights against one another. See id. at 503.

632

R

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-3\NLR306.txt

unknown

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 17

27-APR-07

7:38

VOLUME 51  2006/07

her right to the undisturbed practice of her religion under Art. 4(2),104 her right
to freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion under Art. 3(3),105 and
the express prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion in public
service under Art. 33(2)106 of the German Grundgesetz [Basic Law or
Constitution].
The FAC rejected Ludin’s claims.107 The court acknowledged that Ludin’s
wearing of the Islamic headscarf was entitled to the protection of the Basic
Law, 108 and it acknowledged that those rights are absolute and unqualified unless they are outweighed by the countervailing constitutional rights of others.109
However, the court reasoned, Ludin’s interest in freedom of religion (and the
other rights that flowed from it)110 must be weighed against two competing interests: (1) the interest of students’ freedom of religion111 and (2) the interest of
students’ parents to design their children’s religious education as they desire112 —
104. In addition to providing for the freedom of religion, the Basic Law expressly guarantees that one should be

able to practice one’s right to religious freedom without interference: “Die ungestörte Religionsausübung
wird gewährleistet.” [“The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.”] GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4(2) (F.R.G.), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 19.

R

105. The Basic Law provides expressly for freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion: “Niemand darf

wegen seines Geschlechtes, seiner Abstammung, seiner Rasse, seiner Sprache, seiner Heimat und
Herkunft, seines Glaubens, seiner religiösen oder politischen Anschauungen benachteiligt oder
bevorzugt werden.” [“No one may be disadvantaged or favored because of his sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.”] GRUNDGESETZ [GG]
[Constitution] art. 3(3) (F.R.G.), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 18 (emphasis added).

R

106. Moreover, the Basic Law expressly prohibits discrimination in the public service on the basis of religion

or worldviews:
(2) Jeder Deutsche hat nach seiner Eignung, Befähigung und fachlichen Leistung gleichen
Zugang zu jedem öffentlichen Amte.
[(2) Every German is equally eligible for any public office according to his aptitude, qualifications, and professional achievements.]
(3) Der Genuß bürgerlicher und staatsbürgerlicher Rechte, die Zulassung zu öffentlichen Ämtern sowie die im öffentlichen Dienste erworbenen Rechte sind unabhängig von dem religiösen
Bekenntnis. Niemandem darf aus seiner Zugehörigkeit oder Nichtzugehörigkeit zu einem
Bekenntnisse oder einer Weltanschauung ein Nachteil erwachsen.
[(3) Enjoyment of civil and political rights, eligibility for public office, and rights acquired in
the public service are independent of religious denomination. No one may suffer any disadvantage by reason of his adherence or non-adherence to a denomination or to a philosophical
persuasion.]
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 33(2)–(3) (F.R.G.), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note
103, at 34–35 (emphasis added).
107. Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01 at 1, 4.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 5–6 (explaining that this principle follows from the right to freedom of religion). According to the

neutrality principle, the state must maintain neutrality with respect to questions of religion. Id. at 6
(citation omitted).
111. Id. at 6, 9.
112. Id. at 7 (explaining that this right flows from a combination of the parents’ Art. 4(1) right to religious

freedom, combined with their Art. 6(2) right to care for and raise their children). The relevant portion of
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which interest includes the parents’ right to shield their children from religious
beliefs they deem wrong or harmful.113
After weighing those competing interests, the FAC held that Ludin’s interest to religious freedom was outweighed by the interests to religious freedoms of
the students and their parents.114 The court reasoned that under the neutrality
principle, and particularly in light of the fact that the law requires parents to
send their children to school,115 students have a right to be free from undue influence in their religious development that trumped Ludin’s right to freely practice
her religion.116 Younger students in particular, the court explained, can be easily
influenced and have yet to learn mutual respect and tolerance for those with
different beliefs.117 Moreover, the court rejected Ludin’s argument that the neutrality principle should be relaxed in light of Germany’s growing cultural, ethnic,
and religious diversity in public schools.118 The court also rejected a case-by-case
approach, explaining that even the possibility of any influence on the students
violated those students’ and their parents’ constitutional rights.119
In sum: the FAC held that because the restrictions to Ludin’s constitutional
right to freedom of religion grew out of competing constitutional interests, the
SSA’s policy was not constitutionally infirm.120

Art. 6(2) reads: “Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind das natürliche Recht der Eltern und die
zuv örderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht.” [“Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents and primarily their duty.”] GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 6(2) (F.R.G), translated in
TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 19.

R

113. Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01 at 7. Notably, under the Basic Law, parents are expressly given the right to

decide whether or not their children should attend religion classes in school. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 7(2) (F.R.G.), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 20.
114. Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01 at 10.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 8. In other words: because the students are not yet tolerant of other religions, teachers who belong

to those other religions should be barred from openly practicing them. Apparently, religious freedom mandates no less. This reasoning is flawed because it overlooks that those children will learn tolerance and
respect for other beliefs precisely through exposure to them. See , e.g., Oliver Gerstenberg, Developments — Germany: Freedom Of Conscience In Public Schools, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 94, 103 (2005)
(“Exposure in school to religious commitment can foster an understanding of the reality of a modern
multicultural society and help pupils, from an early age, to learn the importance and techniques of mutual
tolerance.”).
118. Headscarf I, 2 C 21.01 at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
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2. Headscarf II: The Landmark Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court
Following her defeat in the FAC, Ludin filed a Verfassungsbeschwerde
[constitutional complaint or constitutional appeal],121 appealing the Headscarf I
decision to the FCC.122 In her constitutional complaint to the FCC, Ludin
claimed that the SSA’s policy and the subsequent decisions by the administrative
courts, including the FAC, violated her fundamental constitutional rights, including her constitutional rights under Art. 4(1) (freedom of religion), Art. 4(2)
(undisturbed practice of religion), Art. 3(3) (no discrimination on the basis of
religion), and Art. 33(2) (equal access to public office free from discrimination on
the basis of religion).123 Moreover, Ludin also claimed violations of her constitutional rights to human dignity under Art. 1(1),124 freedom of development of
personality under Art. 2(1),125 and, perhaps most importantly, equality before the
law under Art. 3(1)126 of the German Basic Law.127
The FCC’s second senate128 granted Ludin review and, unlike the FAC
before it, found her claims to be meritorious. In Headscarf II, a five to three
majority of the FCC reversed the FAC’s Headscarf I decision (and the decisions
of the administrative courts below) and held unconstitutional the SSA’s policy
denying Ludin employment as a public school teacher because she insisted on
wearing an Islamic headscarf.129 Ludin’s fundamental constitutional rights, the
FCC agreed, had been violated.130
121. For a discussion of the process of filing a constitutional appeal before the FCC, see generally MURRAY &

STÜRNER, supra note 100, at 17. For a discussion of the formal process of litigating a constitutional claim
before the FCC, see generally KOMMERS, supra note 100, at 175–81.
122. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at A.II.
123. Id.
124. “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staat-

lichen Gewalt.” [“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.”]
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at
16.
125. “Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer

verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt.” [“Everyone has
the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend
against the constitutional order or morality.”] GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2(1) (F.R.G),
translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 16.
126. “Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich.” [“All humans are equal before the law.”] GRUNDGESETZ

[GG] [Constitution] art. 3(1) (F.R.G), translated in TSCHENTSCHER, supra note 103, at 16.
127. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at pt. A.II.
128. For an explanation of the division of the FCC into two senates, their admittedly overlapping jurisdic-

tions, and more, see P HILLIP M. BLAIR, F EDERALISM
(1981).
129. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.III.
130. Id.
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Using a methodology similar to that of the FAC below, the FCC first outlined the fundamental constitutional rights and interests of Ludin,131 the constitutional principle of the neutrality of the state,132 the conflicting constitutional
rights and interests of the parents,133 and, also, the constitutional right of students to freedom of (or rather, from) religion.134 After weighing the competing
interests, the FCC decided that while a public school teacher’s interests may, in
theory, be subjugated to those of the parents and the students,135 such a decision
must be based on some positive legal (i.e. statutory) basis.136 Lacking such a basis
in law, the FCC reasoned, the Basic Law itself is inconclusive as to how this
balancing and weighing of competing constitutional rights and interests must be
resolved.137 Moreover, the FCC held that, by itself, the public school teacher’s
wearing of the Islamic headscarf does not violate the principle of neutrality of the
state, since a state that permits its teachers to wear Islamic headscarves does not
thereby adopt the headscarf as its own.138 Therefore, the FCC explained further, the mere potential that in-school conflicts may arise between the competing
constitutional interests of the teachers, parents, and students is insufficient to resolve constitutional balancing of interests and thus did not support the SSA’s
policy.139
However, Ludin’s victory was incomplete because the court failed to make a
general pronouncement that, as a matter of constitutional law, a public school
teacher whose religious beliefs compel her to wear an Islamic headscarf is entitled
to do so freely in the classroom.140 Rather, the FCC avoided that ultimate question and held instead that there was no sufficient statutory basis for the SSA’s
policy.141 Specifically, it held that the SSA’s policy violated Ludin’s constitutional
rights precisely because there was no law giving the SSA the legal authority to
131. Id. at B.II.1–.4.a.
132. Id. at B.II.4.b.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at B.III.
136. Id.
137. Id. at B.II.5.d, ¶ 2.
138. Id. at B.II.5.b.
139. Id. at B.II.5.d, ¶ 2.
140. The court’s decision has led to much criticism — not only for its failure to address the fundamental ques-

tion of the proper role of the Islamic headscarf in public schools, although that particular failure is the
object of much scholarly criticism. See generally Campenhausen, supra note 3; Gerstenberg, supra note
117; Christine Langenfeld & Sarah Mohsen, Developments — Germany: The Teacher Head Scarf
Case, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 86 (2005); Matthias Mahlmann, Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society
and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf
Case, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1099 (2003).
141. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.III.
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deny a job to a public school teacher on the basis that such teacher insists on
wearing an Islamic headscarf (or other religious clothing or symbols).142
At least one pair of commentators suggested that because the FCC based its
decision on Art. 33(2), in combination with Arts. 4(1)–(2) and 33(3), the court
“implicitly dismiss[ed] Ludin’s other complaints of violation of human dignity,
personality rights and equality rights.”143 However, while the authors make an
arguably valid point with respect to the questions of human dignity and personality rights, they miss a crucially important pronouncement by the FCC on the
question of equality:
This [prohibition, growing out of Arts. 33(3) and 4(1)–(2), against discrimination in the access to public service on the basis of religion] does
not preclude the creation of job requirements that affect the freedom of
religion of persons holding, and persons applying for, public service positions and that, therefore, make access to the public service more difficult or even impossible for religious applicants, but this [Arts. 33(3)
and 4(1)–(2) prohibition] does subject [such job requirements] to the
strict justification requirements that apply to restrictions of the unconditionally guaranteed freedom of religion; moreover, the commandment of strict equal treatment of the different faiths must be
adhered-to in both the justification and the practical application of
such job requirements.144

By inserting this passage, the FCC requires the equal treatment of religions — in
law and in practice.145 This section of the Headscarf II decision makes one thing
unmistakably clear: The Länder’s legislatures may ban Islamic headscarves, but if
they do, then they must also ban other religious clothing and symbols, including
Christian and Jewish ones. The Basic Law’s fundamental right to equality demands no less.
Following its decision, the FCC remanded the case to the FAC for further
proceedings not inconsistent with its Headscarf II opinion.146 Crucially impor142. Id.
143. Dagmar Schiek & Carl von Ossietzky, Just a Piece of Cloth? German Courts and Employees with

Headscarves, 33 INDUS. L.J. 68, 70 (2004).
144. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3 (“Dies schließt die Begründung von Dienstpflichten, die in die

Glaubensfreiheit von Amtsinhabern und Bewerbern um öffentliche Ämter eingreifen und damit für
glaubensgebundene Bewerber den Zugang zum öffentlichen Dienst erschweren oder ausschließen, nicht
aus, unterwirft sie aber den strengen Rechtfertigungsanforderungen, die für Einschränkungen der
vorbehaltlos gewährleisteten Glaubensfreiheit gelten; außerdem ist das Gebot strikter Gleichbehandlung der verschiedenen Glaubensrichtungen sowohl in der Begründung als auch in der Praxis der
Durchsetzung solcher Dienstpflichten zu beachten.”) (emphasis added).
145. Notably, this passage appears in a section of the opinion in which the court lays out settled law and the

legal framework for its analysis before embarking on the actual balancing of the various competing interests. This suggests that this declaration is not a matter of controversy or debate, but rather a fundamental
requirement of the constitutional scheme of Germany’s Basic Law.
146. Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.III.
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tant, and perhaps prophetic, the FCC advised the FAC to also consider whatever
changes of law may occur in response to the Headscarf II decision.147
3. Headscarf III: Baden-Württemberg’s Headscarf Law and the
Second Decision of the Federal Administrative Court
Shortly after the Headscarf II decision, and before the FAC decided Ludin’s
case on remand from the FCC,148 Baden-Württemberg enacted a law to regulate
what religious clothing and symbols teachers in public schools may wear.149 The
law provides in relevant part:
Teachers at public schools . . . are not allowed to exercise political, religious, ideological or similar manifestations that may endanger or disturb
the neutrality of the country towards pupils or parents or the political,
religious or ideological peace of the school. Particularly illegitimate is a
behaviour that can appear to pupils or parents to be a teacher[’s] demonstration against human dignity, non-discrimination according to
[A]rticle 3, the rights of freedom or the free and democratic order of the
constitution. The exercise of the task of education according to . . . the
constitution of the land of Baden-Württemberg and the respective exhibition of Christian and occidental educational and cultural values or traditions does not contradict the duty of behaviour
according to sentence 1.150

By enacting this law, Baden-Württemberg intended to prohibit public school
teachers from wearing the Islamic headscarf, while retaining Christian religious
clothing and symbols such as the nun’s habit.151
On remand to the FAC, Ludin’s claims did not prevail.152 The FAC noted
that the FCC’s holding was predicated on the lack of a sufficient statutory basis
for the SSA’s policy of denying a teaching position in a public school to an appli147. Id.
148. See Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 3.
149. See Act Amending the School Code of Baden-Württemberg, supra note 19.
150. Id. (“Lehrkräfte an öffentlichen Schulen . . . dürfen in der Schule keine politischen, religiösen, weltan-

schaulichen oder ähnliche äuß eren Bekundungen abgeben, die geeignet sind, die Neutralität des Landes
gegenüber Schülern und Eltern oder den politischen, religiösen oder weltanschaulichen Schulfrieden zu
gefährden oder zu stören. Insbesondere ist ein äußeres Verhalten unzulässig, welches bei Schülern oder
Eltern den Eindruck hervorrufen kann, dass eine Lehrkraft gegen die Menschenwürde, die Gleichberechtigung der Menschen nach Artikel 3 des Grundgesetzes, die Freiheitsgrundrechte oder die freiheitlichdemokratische Grundordnung auftritt. Die Wahrnehmung des Erziehungsauftrags nach . . . der Verfassung des Landes Baden-Württemberg und die entsprechende Darstellung christlicher und abendländischer Bildungs- und Kulturwerte oder Traditionen widerspricht nicht dem Verhaltensgebot
nach Satz 1.”) (emphasis added).
151. E.g., Kopftuch-Verbot auch für Nonnen [Headscarf Ban For Nuns, Too], NETZEITUNG DEUTSCHLAND, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/308700.html (referring to statements made
by Annette Schavan, Baden-Württemberg’s Minister of Culture, demonstrating just that intent).

152. Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 1.
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cant who insists on wearing religious clothing or symbols.153 Since Baden-Württemberg had enacted just such a law, the FAC reasoned, the SSA could now
legally declare a teacher who refuses to comply with the job requirements established by that law as “unqualified” for a public school teaching position.154 Baden-Württemberg’s law, the FAC explained, struck one, albeit not the only,
possible balance between the competing interests of Ludin’s fundamental constitutional rights,155 the fundamental constitutional rights of the students (and their
parents), and the principle of neutrality.156 According to the FAC, it was within
the broad legislative authority of a democratically elected legislature to decide
how to treat the diversity of religious beliefs157 and how to resolve that tension.158 Baden-Württemberg, the FAC concluded, was thus properly within its
constitutional power to enact a categorical law to avoid even the possibility of
conflicts that could arise out of the competing fundamental interests of teachers,
students, and parents159 and, therefore, Baden-Württemberg’s decision to not
permit a case-by-case approach under the enacted law was legitimate.160
The FAC also noted the FCC’s pronouncement that any law enacted in
response to the Headscarf II decision must treat different religions with strict
equality.161 “Exceptions for particular forms of religiously motivated clothing[,]”
the FAC held, “are therefore not permissible.”162 Notwithstanding, the FAC rejected the argument that Baden-Württemberg’s exception for the “exhibition of
Christian and occidental educational and cultural values or traditions”163 violates
these equal treatment principles.164 The FAC reasoned that the reference to
Christian and occidental values in Baden-Württemberg’s law does not create an
illegal preferential treatment of the Christian confession.165 Rather, the FAC
reasoned, that reference to the Christian faith merely designates values that —
although they developed out of a Christian-occidental tradition — are divorced
from their religious meaning and now inform fundamental values of the Basic
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 3–4, 10.
155. A listing of those rights is omitted to avoid unnecessary repetition. For such a listing, see supra Part

III.A.1–.2.
156. Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 10–11.
157. Id. at 11.
158. Id. at 11–12.
159. Id. at 9, 12.
160. Id. at 9, 13.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 13 (“Ausnahmen für bestimmte Formen religiös motivierter Kleidung . . . kommen daher nicht in

Betracht.”).
163. Act Amending the School Code of Baden-Württemberg, supra note 19.
164. Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 13.
165. Id. at 14.
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Law, including inviolable human dignity (Art. 1), the equality of all humans
and sexes (Art. 3), and religious freedom (Art. 4).166 “Further,” the FAC continued, “the phrase includes humane values such as the willingness to help others,
care and general consideration for others, and solidarity with those who are
weaker.”167 After all, the FAC declared, the demonstration of such Christian and
occidental values is not the same as the profession of an individual religious
faith.168 Therefore, in the opinion of the FAC, those Christian educational and
cultural values are ones with which every public servant should be able to agree,
irrespective of his or her religious persuasion.169
“Also,” the FAC concluded, Baden-Württemberg’s law “does not excessively
affect the Islamic religious community” because “the prohibition is limited to
teachers in public schools,” and thus affects neither the right of students at public
(or private) schools, nor the right of teachers at private schools to wear an Islamic
headscarf.170
B.

Legislative Response to the Constitutional Court’s Decision

Even before the FAC announced its Headscarf III decision, most Länder’s
legislatures had responded to the FCC’s Headscarf II opinion.171 In all, as of
September 2006, twelve of Germany’s sixteen Länder are at some stage in the
legislative process of enacting laws regulating what religious clothing and symbols teachers may or may not wear in public schools.172
Eight Länder173 — Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Saarland — enacted laws in response to Headscarf II.174 Three more — Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate,
and Schleswig-Holstein — drafted proposed laws,175 of which Brandenburg’s
failed to pass,176 and Schleswig-Holstein’s was abandoned by the legislature.177
166. Id.
167. Id. (“Weiter umfasst der Begriff humane Werte wie Hilfsbereitschaft, Sorge für und allgemeine Rück-

sichtnahme auf den Nächsten sowie Solidarität mit dem Schwächeren.”).
168. Id. at 10.
169. Id. at 14.
170. Id. at 15 (“Die islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft wird davon auch nicht betroffen, da sich das Verbot auf

Lehrer im Staatsdienst beschränkt, Schülerinnen auch an öffentlichen Schulen und Lehrerinnen an
Privatschulen also das Tragen eines Kopftuchs unbenommen bleibt.”).
171. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.

R

172. See id. Notably, some Länder’s legislations apply generally to all, or most, public servants. However, this

Note focuses on teachers in public schools and thus does not analyze those broader laws.
173. The translations of the Länder’s names are based on Münz & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 96.

R

174. Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.

R

175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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Finally, five Länder — Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Lower Pomerania, Saxony,
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia — decided to forego special legislation.178
Many of those headscarf laws, whether enacted or still in draft form, are
remarkably similar and can be summarized into one of three categories for the
purpose of analysis. The first category of laws, like Baden-Württemberg’s, carves
out exceptions for the Christian religion and occidental traditions and values
(“Category A Laws”).179 The large majority of headscarf laws comprise this first
category.180
The second category consists of headscarf laws that focus on the effect of a
particular teacher’s outward appearance, but do not strictly prohibit religious
clothing or symbols, nor do they carve out exceptions for the Christian faith or
occidental traditions and values (“Category B Laws”). Bremen’s law provides in
relevant part that “the outer appearance of the teaching and caring staff in school
may not be such as to disturb religious and ideological feelings of pupils and
parents or to carry tensions into school [that] endanger its peace through a violation of religious and ideological neutrality.”181 Lower Saxony’s law also falls into
this category.182
The third and final category consists of only one law — that of the Land
Berlin (“Berlin’s Law”) — and takes yet another approach. Berlin’s Law categorically bars all public school teachers from wearing virtually any religious
clothing and symbols (the only exception being non-noticeable garments). It provides in relevant part: “Teachers . . . at public schools . . . are not allowed to wear
any visible religious or ideological symbols that signal the spectator an affiliation
to a specific religious or ideological community and any noticeably religious or
ideologically imbued garments.”183
178. See id.
179. For the text of Baden-Württemberg’s law, see supra note 150 and accompanying text.

R

180. This category includes, in addition to Baden-Württemberg’s law, the laws of Bavaria, Brandenburg,

Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.
181. Gesetz zur Änderung des Bremischen Schulgesetzes [Act Amending the School Code of Bremen], June 28,

2005, Bremen GBl. S. 245, Nr. 31 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/
GesetzBremen26082005.htm (German), http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/eng/kopftuch.htm (abridged English) (“[D]as äußere Erscheinungsbild der Lehrkräfte und des betreuenden Personals darf in der Schule
nicht dazu geeignet sein, die religiösen und weltanschaulichen Empfindungen der Schülerinnen und Schüler und der Erziehungsberechtigten zu stören oder Spannungen, die den Schulfrieden durch Verletzung
der religiösen und weltanschaulichen Neutralität gefährden, in die Schule zu tragen.”).
182. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.
183. Gesetz zur Schaffung eines Gesetzes zu Artikel 29 der Verfassung von Berlin [Act for the Creation of a

Law to Article 29 of the Constitution of Berlin], Jan. 27, 2005, Berlin GVBl. S. 92, Nr. 4 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/GesetzBerlin27012005.htm (German), http://
www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/eng/kopftuch.htm (abridged English) (“Lehrkräfte . . . in den öffentlichen
Schulen . . . dürfen innerhalb des Dienstes keine sichtbaren religiösen oder weltanschaulichen Symbole, die
für die Betrachterin oder den Betrachter eine Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Religions- oder Weltan-
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Since Sachsen-Anhalt abandoned its efforts to enact a specific headscarf law,
its law is not included in this categorization system.184 These three categories of
laws, Category A Laws, Category B Laws, and Berlin’s Law, form the basis for
the following analysis.
IV.

THE HEADSCARF III DECISION AND THE LÄNDER’S HEADSCARF LAW’S

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY DEPRIVE FEMALE MUSLIM PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS OF
THEIR RIGHTS TO EQUALITY AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION

In its Headscarf III decision, the Federal Administrative Court (“FAC”)
upheld Baden-Württemberg’s law as being in accordance with the landmark decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (“FCC”).185 The FAC’s decision was
fundamentally flawed, however, because it failed to recognize a glaring defect in
Baden-Württemberg’s statutory scheme — that it, like the other Category A
Laws, carves out an unconstitutional preference for the Christian religion and
occidental traditions and values, thus violating the right to equality and freedom
of religion of Muslim public school teachers.
A.

Why the Headscarf III Court Got It Wrong

In Headscarf III, the FAC failed to apply the “principles of equality” articulated by the FCC to Baden-Württemberg’s archetypal Category A Law. As
explained above, the FAC reasoned that the reference to Christian and occidental
beliefs and values in Baden-Württemberg’s law did not violate the equality principles because it did not create an illegal preferential treatment of the Christian
confession.186 What the FAC failed to realize was that Baden-Württemberg’s
Category A Law does precisely that, i.e., it treats Muslim public school teachers
who wear religious symbols and clothing differently from otherwise equally-situated Christian public school teachers who wear religious symbols and clothing.
That to do this was the express intent of the legislature of Baden-Württemberg in enacting its headscarf law became unmistakably clear in the Headscarf III case: The Land’s attorney argued before the FAC that an Islamic
headscarf falls under the law’s prohibition against religious symbols but a nun’s
habit does not. Rather, the Land asserted, a nun’s habit is not a religious symbol
but, instead, constitutes “work attire” (notwithstanding German nuns’ vocal protests to that characterization of their habit — clothing that, for them, is clearly
an expression of their religious beliefs187) and thus falls under the law’s language
schauungsgemeinschaft demonstrieren, und keine auffallenden religiös oder weltanschaulich geprägten
Kleidungsstücke tragen.”).
184. See Headscarf Prohibition Working Materials, supra note 22.
185. Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 1, 3–4, 10.
186. See supra notes 161–169 and accompanying text.
187. See , e .g., Nonnentracht an Schulen: “Eindeutig religiös motivierte Kleidung” [The Nun’s Habit in

Schools: “Clearly a Religiously-Motivated Clothing”], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 13, 2004, http://
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excluding displays of Christian and occidental traditions and values from BadenWürttemberg’s law’s restrictions.188 The FAC rejected the argument and held
that all religions must be treated equally; “[e]xceptions for particular forms of
religiously motivated clothing in certain regions, as contended by the [advocate
for Baden-Württemberg] during oral argument, are therefore not
permissible.”189
Baden-Württemberg’s intent to exclude only headscarf-wearing Muslims
became even clearer, albeit only in the aftermath of Headscarf III, when it tried
to circumvent the FAC’s declaration that all — yes, all — religions must be
treated equally under the law that the Land itself had promulgated and that no
exceptions may be had for the Christian religion. Following Headscarf III,
however, Baden-Württemberg continued to permit nuns to wear their habits
while teaching in public schools, basing its defiance of the FAC’s decision on the
technical argument that the Headscarf III decision addressed only the narrow
question of the Islamic headscarf under the new laws, not the question of the
nun’s habit under the new laws.190 This action, of course, makes Baden-Württemberg’s law all the more constitutionally questionable. As former FCC judge
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde points out, a Muslim woman who is denied a position as a public school teacher in Baden-Württemberg because she insists on
wearing an Islamic headscarf could file suit, alleging that the Land’s permissive
policy towards nuns’ habits in Baden-Württemberg’s public schools constitutes
unconstitutional discrimination and violates her Basic Law right to equality.191
Of course, the FAC did not foresee how Baden-Württemberg would respond
to its decision when it ruled on Ludin’s claim in the Headscarf III case. Nevertheless, the signs were clear: Baden-Württemberg was bent on enacting a law
that would allow it to legally discriminate against the Muslim minority and,
perhaps, other unpopular religious minorities in the future. Of course, what
makes Baden-Württemberg’s law unconstitutional under the FCC’s jurisprudence is not its intent. Rather, Baden-Württemberg’s law is unconstitutional
because it, in fact, not merely in intent, allows the Land to discriminate against
Muslim teachers who wear an Islamic headscarf by banning those teachers from
www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,322964,00.html (quoting Aloisia Höing, “the highest-ranking
nun in Germany” [“die oberste Ordensschwester in Deutschland”] and chairwoman of VOD, a German
nuns’ association that represents some 28,000 German nuns, as saying that the habit is “a sign of religiosity and the relationship with God” [“ein Zeichen der Religiosität und der Beziehung zu Gott”]).
188. See Nonnen an Schulen: Nicht ohne meine Kutte [Nuns at Schools: Not Without My Habit],

SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2004, http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,322789,00.html.
189. Headscarf III, 2 C 45.03 at 13 (“Ausnahmen für bestimmte Formen religiös motivierter Kleidung in

bestimmten Regionen, wie sie der Prozessbevollmächtigte des Beklagten in der mündlichen Verhandlung in Erwägung gezogen hat, kommen daher nicht in Betracht.”) (emphasis added).
190. The Nun’s Habit in Schools: “Clearly a Religiously-Motivated Clothing,” supra note 187.
191. Unterricht ohne Haube [Class Without a Habit], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.spie-

gel.de/spiegel/0,1518,323678,00.html.
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public schools while permitting nuns who wear their habits to continue to teach
in public schools — at least until recently.192 This discriminatory function was
built into Baden-Württemberg’s prototype Category A Law when that Land’s
legislators excluded Christian and occidental values and traditions from regulation. Rather than upholding Baden-Württemberg’s headscarf law, therefore, the
FAC should have struck it down for violating Ludin’s fundamental Basic Law
rights to equality and freedom of religion.
B.

Laws Violating the Headscarf II Decision

It follows from the above analysis that Baden-Württemberg’s law and the
other Category A Laws fail to pass constitutional muster under the FCC’s Headscarf II decision because they, in theory and — as the example of Baden-Württemberg proves — in application, allow Länder to treat members of certain
(popular) religious groups differently from otherwise similarly situated members
of other (less popular) religious groups. In practical application, this means that
school authorities in Länder with Category A Laws can legally ban headscarfwearing Muslim public school teachers while continuing to allow Christian
teachers (e.g., nuns) to wear religious clothing and symbols — all simply by
means of the exception for “Christian and occidental beliefs and values” that is
included in all Category A Laws. This, however, runs afoul of the FCC’s declaration that all religions must be treated equally — both in theory and in application. If, or when, a Category A Law finds its way to the FCC, the FCC should

192. After the author had graduated from law school, and while this Note was going through the editorial

process of the Law Review, but before publication of this Note, the Stuttgart Verwaltungsgericht [administrative trial court] (the same court that had originally rejected Ludin’s complaint in the pre-Headscarf II world), held in mid-2006 that Baden-Württemberg may not ban headscarf-wearing public school
teachers from Baden-Württemberg’s public schools while nuns are permitted to teach in full habits. See
Dietmar Hipp, Koptfuch-Urteil: Nonnen retten den Islam [Headscarf Decision: Nuns Rescue Islam], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Jul. 8, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/schule/0,1518,425678,00.html.
In that case, a Muslim public school teacher who was asked to take off her headscarf or be barred from
teaching filed a complaint, asserting that her right to equal treatment was violated. See id. The court
agreed, reasoning that Baden-Württemberg could not, in the “practical application” of its “headscarf law,”
accord certain religious persuasions preferential treatment (by choosing to not enforce the headscarf law’s
restrictions against the members or that religious persuasion — in this case, Catholic nuns). See id.
Ultimately, the court held, Baden-Württemberg had no choice but to either apply the law equally to all or
to none of its public school teachers. See id. Of course, the court’s decision did not go as far as this author
advocates it should have because the court failed to strike down the law itself; the court merely forced
Baden-Württemberg to choose whether to tolerate headscarf-wearing Muslim public school teachers or
whether to equally apply the law’s restrictions to its habit-wearing Catholic nuns who teach in public
schools. See id. However, since forcing Catholic nuns to de-robe or forcing them to resign from school
service is not a feasible political option in Baden-Württemberg, see infra, notes 196–199 and accompanying text, Muslim public school teachers get a reprieve — at least while there are still nuns who teach in
public schools in Baden-Württemberg. See id.
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strike it down as violating its Headscarf II decision because it fails to satisfy the
principle of equal treatment “in law and in practice.”193
C.

Laws Passing Muster Under the Headscarf II Decision

Category B Laws and the Berlin Law, however, are a different story. In a
constitutional appeal to the FCC, both Category B Laws and the Berlin Law
would most likely pass muster because they treat all religions alike, at least as a
matter of law.
A potential ground for a constitutional attack could be, of course, discriminatory application. If it turned out that these laws are used to prohibit only Muslim women from wearing an Islamic headscarf, but were not applied to, for
example, nuns who insist on wearing their habits, then a convincing argument
could be made that these laws violate those Muslim teachers’ fundamental right
to equality. In fact, since these laws do not even engage in the pretense of carving our exceptions for “Christian and occidental beliefs and values,” as their Category A counterparts do, a Land pursuing such a discriminatory practice would
have little legal ground on which to stand in an attempt to justify its permissive
stance towards nuns (or other non-Muslims).
While such “unequal application” arguments may not be as strong as the
argument against Category A Laws that carve out express exceptions for Christian and occidental beliefs and values,194 it is nevertheless a potentially winning
argument. It is bolstered primarily by the FCC’s holding that any laws regulating religious clothing and symbols must treat all religious faiths equally not only
de jure but also de facto — in law and in practice.195
D. If Banning Some Is Not An Option, What Is? — Possible
Solutions
If, as argued in this Note, most of the headscarf laws (i.e., all of the Category
A Laws) promulgated in response to the Headscarf decisions violate the German
Constitution’s guarantee to equality as a matter of law, then the Länder must
reconsider their regulation of the Islamic headscarf. Several possible solutions
emerge to the legislatures’ dilemma as to what to do about public school teachers
193. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3. Notably,

R

the author came to this conclusion independently of Langenfeld & Mohsen, who arrive at a similar result:
[M]ost of the [Category A] laws suggest (whether explicitly or in various interpretations) that the
manifestation of Christian or other traditional Western beliefs does not contravene the rule of
neutrality and even that it fulfils the state’s educational mandate. It is highly doubtful that the
[FCC] will find these provisions in conformity with the equality clauses of the Basic Law, given
the emphasis that the Court has placed on equal treatment of religious groups by the legislature.
Langenfeld & Mohsen, supra note 140, at 92.

R

194. See supra Part IV.B.
195. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3.
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and religious clothing and symbols: ban all, ban none, permit all, or use a caseby-case approach.
1. Ban All
The Länder could well choose to ban all teachers in public schools from
wearing any religious clothing or symbols.
This most restrictive approach would most certainly pass constitutional
muster because it would treat all religions equally under the law.
However, such a law is unlikely to garner support in devotedly Christian
Länder, such as Bavaria or Baden-Württemberg,196 where politicians enacted
the current headscarf laws with the express intent of banning the Islamic headscarf from public school teachers’ heads while retaining crucifixes and nuns’ habits
in public classrooms.197 This intent has been put into practice in Baden-Württemberg and continues to be practiced until recently.198 In those Länder, such a
wholesale ban would most likely be a political impossibility,199 effectively mooting the constitutional legal question.
2. Ban None
Alternatively, Länder wishing to retain Christian religious clothing and
symbols can either repeal already-enacted headscarf laws or not re-enact headscarf laws once they are found unconstitutional, as this Note contends they eventually will be. This would have the effect of de-regulating what religious
clothing and symbols teachers in public schools may wear. This implied wholesale
permission would constitute little more than changing the status quo to the status quo ante, i.e. the legal state that existed before the Headscarf I and III
decisions and before the post-Headscarf II laws were enacted.
This approach, too, would pass constitutional muster because all religious
clothing and symbols would be equally de-regulated.200
196. Bavaria, for example, having already failed three times (in 1986, 1995, and 1998), is once again drafting

a proposal to amend Germany’s (federal) civil penal law to make mere blasphemy — even if it does not,
as the current civil penal law requires, endanger the public peace — an offense punishable by fines and a
prison sentence of up to three years. Strafe für Gotteslästerei: Bayern will Gesetz verschärfen [Penalty
for Blasphemy: Bavaria Wanting to Ratched Up Law], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2006, http://
www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,411952,00.html. This renewed momentum to tighten the civil penal
law with respect to blasphemy is a response to the recent and rather irreverent MTV television series
“Popetown” satirizing the Pope and the Catholic Church. Id.
197. See , e.g., Headscarf Ban For Nuns, Too, supra note 151 (describing that Schavan had intended that

R

the new school law would prohibit the Islamic headscarf but would continue to permit Christian symbols).
198. See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.

R

199. See , e .g., The Nun’s Habit in Schools: “Clearly a Religiously-Motivated Clothing,” supra note 187

R

(quoting Aloisia Höing as saying that she can not imagine that German society would accept an all-out
ban of any and all religious symbols from public schools).
200. Of course, this approach, as such, would not come before the court as an equality challenge because it would

present no cause for a constitutional challenge by public school teachers. After all, if they are all equally
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However, this approach may prove problematic insofar as it provides no
positive, express legal protections to members of potentially unpopular religious
minorities. Absent language protecting the choice of a public school teacher to
wear religious clothing or symbols, a Land could conceivably use the religious
clothing or symbols as a pretext to discriminate against such public school teachers
but not members of other religious groups. Of course, such a Land would have to
employ a different pretext from what Baden-Württemberg employed (lack of
“qualification to teach” on the basis of her wearing an Islamic headscarf) in ousting Ludin from its public schools because that pretext failed for having no statutory foundation. As the FCC’s Headscarf II decision makes clear, a Land
cannot oust a teacher without a statutory foundation. And whatever statutory
pretext a Land were to create would then become subject to judicial scrutiny and
would, hopefully, be recognized and struck down as such — just as Baden-Württemberg’s non-statutory pretext was, and just as the Land’s current statutory
scheme should be.
3. Permit All
The Länder could — and should — go even further than complete deregulation. They could — and should — enact laws that expressly permit public
school teachers to wear any religious clothing or symbols.201 Because it would
treat all religions with equal acceptance, this approach, too, would pass constitutional muster under the Headscarf II decision.
This approach — creating an actual, positive, unqualified legal permission
for public school teachers to wear religious clothing and symbols — would, in
effect, attach an irrebutable presumption of legitimacy to the wearing of a headscarf by a female Muslim public school teacher. Moreover, this approach would
put it beyond a Land’s power to regulate any individual public school teacher’s
wearing of religious clothing or symbols. Unlike under the Ban None approach, a
Land bent on discriminating against its unpopular religious minorities would be
precluded from using religious clothing or symbols as a pretext for discrimination.
In other words, a Land’s justification for ousting a teacher as unqualified cannot
simply be based on the grounds that he or she is “unqualified.” Not only would
doing so constitute circular reasoning (an offense against logic, if nothing else) but
also a lack of statutory foundation (an offense against the German constitution, as
free to wear what they chose, then why bring suit? It would be more likely for this approach to be
challenged by a public school student or the parents of a public school student claiming that the student’s or
his or her parents’ constitutional rights are violated by a public school teacher’s wearing of religious clothing or symbols. For a list of the constitutional guarantees to which such a student or parent would refer in
bringing such a claim, see supra Part III.A.1 and, in particular, notes 110–113 and the accompanying
text.
201. That doing so would not necessarily run afoul of the neutrality principle has been demonstrated, ironically,

by Baden-Württemberg, which allows nuns to teach in public schools while wearing their habits. See The
Nun’s Habit in Schools: “Clearly a Religiously-Motivated Clothing,” supra note 189.
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the FCC makes clear). The result would be that a Land would have to provide
specific statutory criteria based upon which it determines that someone is unqualified to teach. And, if the Permit All approach were elected, that reason or criterion could not be religious clothing or symbols. Therefore, this approach is
preferable to the Ban None approach. Moreover, this approach is also preferable
to a case-by-case approach, as the following section discusses. For the foregoing
reasons, the German Länder should enact laws granting to all teachers the express, unqualified permission to wear religious clothing and symbols in public
schools.
4. Why Permitting All Is Preferable to a Case-By-Case
Approach
Some Länder might propose to implement some form of a case-by-case approach in an attempt to assuage both political factions — those calling for a
permissive attitude towards religious clothing and symbols and those calling for
restrictive regulation.
A case-by-case approach would pass constitutional muster under the Headscarf II decision because, at least on its face, it treats all religions equally. However, an unqualified, permissive approach (Permit All) is preferable to a case-bycase approach for two reasons, one legal and the other political.
The first reason, a legal reason, is based on the FCC’s pronouncement that
any law regulating religious clothing and symbols must ensure equality of the
different religious faiths both in law and in practice.202 That pronouncement
suggests a constitutional preference for equal treatment of religions and against
discrimination on the basis of religion. Based on that principle, a probabilistic
analysis demonstrates why the Permit All approach is preferable to a case-by-case
approach: If we consider (1) the status of Muslims as a religious minority in
Germany,203 (2) the express intent of several Länder’s lawmakers to pass laws
that discriminate against that Muslim minority (by prohibiting Islamic headscarves but not Christian nuns’ habits and other expressions of Christian and
occidental values),204 and (3) the pattern of actual discrimination against that
Muslim minority in law, practice, or both, as established by current Category A
Laws, 205 then the likelihood that a law that permits a Land’s government to
202. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3.
203. See discussion of the Muslim population in Germany supra Part II.A.
204. See , e .g., Headscarf Ban For Nuns, Too, supra note 151 (referring to statements by Schavan demon-

R

strating just that intent).
205. This discrimination is most dramatically exemplified by Baden-Württemberg’s practice until recently —

even following Headscarf II and Headscarf III — to permit nuns who are public school teachers to wear
their habits while prohibiting Muslim public school teachers to wear their Islamic headscarves. See supra
note 190 and accompanying text. This practice ended only recently, and only after a court forced the Land
to choose whether to apply its law equally to all or equally to none of the public school teachers. See supra
note 192 and accompanying text.
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make discretionary decisions regarding religious clothing and symbols would be
enacted and applied with the intent and effect of discriminating against the
Muslim minority is significantly greater than the likelihood that a law that entirely eliminates discretion would be enacted and applied with the same discriminatory intent and effect.206 The Permit All approach, therefore, better satisfies
the constitutional preference, as pronounced by the FCC, for the equal treatment
of religions than a case-by-case approach.
The second reason, a political reason, for favoring the Permit All approach
over a case-by-case approach finds its root in Germany’s relatively recent history
of the oppression, persecution, and mass-murder of unpopular religious and ethnic minorities during the Third Reich. Given that historical legacy, a law regulating what religious clothing and symbols public school teachers may wear should
avoid even the appearance of discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, lest Germany should suffer a loss of the goodwill it has accumulated in the
world community over the past decades since WWII with respect to Germany’s
commitment to religious freedom and liberty. A law that permits all public school
teachers, no matter their individual religions, to wear religious clothing or symbols would, by default, more effectively achieve the goal contemplated by the foregoing statement than a law affording a German Land discretionary authority to
decide who gets to wear religious clothing or symbols and who does not. The
constitutional relevance of this historical legacy is demonstrated by the importance that it played in shaping the principles of religious liberty espoused in the
Basic Law.207
For these reasons, the Permit All approach is preferable to a case-by-case
approach.
5. If Case-By-Case It Must Be, Then How Ought It Be?
Nevertheless, some Länder — faced, sooner or later, with the unconstitutionality of Category A Laws and the political opposition to both wholesale bans
(Ban All) or wholesale permissions (Permit All) of teachers’ wearing of religious
clothing or symbols in public schools — are more than likely to consider adopting
case-by-case approaches. However, as the following discussion illustrates, not all
case-by-case approaches are alike. Therefore, notwithstanding the reasons that
speak in favor of adopting the Permit All approach over a case-by-case approach,
if a Land were to enact a case-by-case approach, then the constitutional prefer-

206. Put more bluntly: considering the listed three factors, the governments of the German Länder (especially

Länder that have enacted Category A Laws) should not be trusted to adjudicate such case-by-case determinations fairly unless the group more likely to be victimized by discrimination (i.e., the Muslim religious minority) enjoys extraordinary, substantive legal protection. The presumption in favor of the
Muslim minority, as proposed here, would constitute just such extraordinary, substantive legal protection.
207. K OMMERS, supra note 100, at 217.

R

649

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-3\NLR306.txt

unknown

Seq: 34

27-APR-07

7:38

HEADSCARVES IN GERMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

ence for the equal treatment of religions would dictate that the least objectionable
case-by-case approach be one that resolves borderline case in favor of teachers.
Case-by-case approaches could take the form of a restrictive case-by-case
approach or a permissive case-by-case approach. Under a restrictive case-by-case
approach, all religious clothing and symbols would be banned (Ban All), but the
school authority (or some other qualified decision-making body) would have discretionary power to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis to allow individual
teachers to wear some particular religious clothing or symbol(s). Under a permissive case-by-case approach, all religious clothing and symbols would be permitted, either impliedly (Ban None) or expressly (Permit All), but the school
authority (or, again, some other qualified decision-making body) would have discretionary power to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis to prohibit individual teachers from wearing some particular religious clothing or symbol(s).
Of course, there are many permutations based on the above templates.
However, a restrictive case-by-case approach would most likely fail — either for
political or legal reasons. In most of the Länder, a restrictive case-by-case approach, just like the Ban All approach, would probably fail to overcome political
opposition. While some legislators might try to appease political opposition to an
unqualified Ban All approach by promising to use the discretionary power to
make exceptions inherent in a restrictive case-by-case exclusively to the benefit of
Christian teachers, and always to the detriment of Muslim teachers, such use of
discretionary power would run afoul of the FCC’s pronouncement that religious
equality must be guaranteed in both law and practice.208 In other words, even
if enacted, such a restrictive case-by-case approach would probably be held unconstitutional sooner or later for violating, it its application (i.e., in “practice”),
the mandate for religious equality in law and practice.
Langenfeld and Mohsen, two co-commentators, have suggested a permissive
case-by-case approach.209 Their case-by-case approach, however, adds another
dimension to the discussion. They propose that borderline cases should be resolved
in favor of the students,210 which suggests a presumption in favor of the students
(and their parents) and against the teacher.
However, if a Land were to elect a case-by-case approach, whether restrictive or permissive, then a borderline case should be resolved in favor of the
teacher, rather than in favor of the students. As before, with respect to preferring
the Permit All approach to a case-by-case approach, there are two reasons, one
legal and one political, that support a presumption in favor of the teacher and
his/her constitutional interests.
208. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3.

R

209. LANGENFELD & MOHSEN, supra note 140, at 91 (“The decision as to whether a teacher is to be prohib-

R

ited from wearing the headscarf during classes has to be taken on a case-by-case basis.”).
210. Id. at 92 (“In borderline cases, the benefit of the doubt should be given not to the teacher but to the

fundamental rights of the pupils (and their parents).”).
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The first reason, a legal reason, is also rooted in a probabilistic analysis of
the constitutional preference,211 as indicated by the FCC, for the equal treatment
of religions and against discrimination on the basis of religion.212 If we consider,
once again, (1) the status of Muslims as a religious minority in Germany,213 (2)
the express intent of several Länder’s lawmakers to pass laws that discriminate
against that Muslim minority (by prohibiting Islamic headscarves but not Christian nuns’ habits and other expressions of Christian and occidental values),214
and (3) the pattern of actual discrimination against that Muslim minority in
law, practice, or both, as established by current Category A Laws,215 then the
likelihood that a law with a presumption in favor of the students would be enacted and applied with the intent and effect of discriminating against the Muslim minority is significantly greater than the likelihood that a law with a
presumption in favor of the teachers would be enacted and applied with the same
discriminatory intent and effect.216 A presumption in favor of teachers, therefore, better satisfies the FCC-pronounced constitutional mandate for the equal
treatment of religions.
The second reason is rooted in the same political considerations that support
favoring the Permit All approach over any case-by-case approach.217 Given
Germany’s Third Reich history of oppressing religious minorities, and the political incentives derived therefrom, any attempt to regulate — on a case-by-case
basis, no less — what religious clothing and symbols teachers in public schools
may wear, should be as protective of potentially unpopular religious minorities as
possible.
Therefore, if a case-by-case approach were elected, then borderline cases
should be decided in favor of teachers because doing so would best balance the
competing constitutional interests of teachers and students (and their parents).218
A presumption in favor of the teacher would act as an effective safeguard against
discriminatory treatment that could otherwise result from uneven application of
permissive (or restrictive) case-by-case approaches that resolve borderline cases in
favor of the student.
In sum, an express, unqualified permissive approach is preferable to any
other approach — even a permissive case-by-case approach that resolves border211. See supra Part IV.D.4.
212. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Headscarf II, 2 BvR 1436/02 at B.II.3.

R

213. See discussion of the Muslim population in Germany supra Part II.A.
214. See , e .g., Headscarf Ban For Nuns, Too, supra note 151 (referring to statements by Schavan demon-

strating just that intent).
215. See supra note 205.
216. Again, the governments of the Länder can not be trusted to fairly adjudicate such borderline cases. See

supra note 206.
217. See supra Part IV.D.4.
218. As compared to a case-by-case approach that resolves borderline cases in favor of the students.
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line cases in favor of teachers — because it would best guard against religious
discrimination against unpopular religious minorities at the hand of the state.
By denying discretionary judgment, the Permit All approach would most effectively protect against xenophobic, knee-jerk responses to Islamic headscarves and
the religious clothing and symbols of other unpopular religious minorities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The [German] multicultural society has been a
colossal failure.219
Yes to openness and tolerance; no to Islamic head scarves.220

The legislative, political, and judicial fight over the Islamic headscarf is far
from over. Inevitably, some aspiring teacher who is a religious Muslim — and
who insists on wearing her headscarf — will take up the fight where Ludin has
left it. Then, if most of the headscarf-banning laws promulgated in recent years
and months fail to meet constitutional muster, as this Note argues they must, the
legislatures of the many Länder bent on a headscarf ban will be sent back to their
drawing boards. Perhaps then they will realize, and appreciate, their dilemma
more fully: Whether to ban all forms of religious symbols and all religiously inspired clothing, uniformly, with no preferential treatment for Christian and occidental beliefs and values, or whether to welcome — implicitly or expressly — all
religious symbols and articles of clothing, including the Islamic headscarf, into the
classroom. As a legal — and, incidentally, political — compromise, this Note
proposes a law that makes expressly and unconditionally permissible all religious
clothing and symbols.
Until then, however, the statements by Edmund Stoiber and Angela Merkel
that appear at the beginning of this section prove prophetic: For Ludin, and
others like her, the German multicultural society has, indeed, been a colossal failure, as, despite Germany’s self-perceived openness and tolerance,221 the German
219. Statement made by Angela Merkel, then-chairman of the Christian-Democratic Union (Christlich-

Demokratische Union or “CDU”) and now-Chancellor of Germany, quoted in Integrationsdebatte:
Schr öder warnt vor Kampf der Kulturen [Integration debate: Schroeder warns of a battle of the
cultures], F RANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZEITUNG, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1, available at http://
www.faz.net (“Die multikulturelle Gesellschaft ist grandios gescheitert.”). This statement was delivered
in a debate over the integration of and tolerance for ethnic and religious minority aliens, in particular
Turkish and other Muslim immigrants. Merkel has since succeeded Gerhard Schröder as the Chancellor of
Germany. See , e.g., Reuters, German Economy Is First and Biggest Test for Merkel, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-germany.html.
220. Statement made by Edmund Stoiber, Prime Minister of Bavaria, quoted in Richard Bernstein, Ger-

many’s Challenge on Muslim Integration in Europe, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 10, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 13681836. This statement was made in the same context as Angela Merkel’s
statement. See supra note 219.

R

221. See GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE, supra note 17, at ch. “Society” (“Open-minded, modern and toler-

R

ant — these are the hallmarks of German society at the beginning of the 21st century.”).
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courts and a majority of the Länder sound a resolute Nein! to the Islamic headscarf. Germany’s religious female Muslims who want to become public school
teachers thus find themselves in the unenviable position of either having to bury
their professional aspirations or having to compromise and abandon their religious practices and beliefs. Meanwhile, all Ludin has to show for Germany’s selfproclaimed “openness and tolerance” is some =C 21,833.00 in legal and court
fees.222

222. Headscarf III, BVerwGE 2 C 45.03 at 2, 15 (stating that the plaintiff is liable for the costs of the

appeal).
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